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Probability, Arrow of Time and Decoherence∗
Guido Bacciagaluppi†
Abstract
This paper relates both to the metaphysics of probability and to the
physics of time asymmetry. Using the formalism of decoherent histo-
ries, it investigates whether intuitions about intrinsic time directedness
that are often associated with probability can be justified in the con-
text of no-collapse approaches to quantum mechanics. The standard
(two-vector) approach to time symmetry in the decoherent histories
literature is criticised, and an alternative approach is proposed, based
on two decoherence conditions (‘forwards’ and ‘backwards’) within the
one-vector formalism. In turn, considerations of forwards and back-
wards decoherence and of decoherence and recoherence suggest that
a time-directed interpretation of probabilities, if adopted, should be
both contingent and perspectival.
1 Introduction
Probabilities are often treated in a time-asymmetric way, for example when
used in deliberations about future courses of action, or when chances are
said to evolve by conditionalisation upon events being actualised, so that
chances of past events are always equal to 0 or 1. In metaphysical terms,
this is often associated with the notion of an ‘open future’ and a ‘fixed past’.
Is this asymmetry intrinsic to the notion of probability, or is it imposed at
the level of interpretation? This is the main question we wish to examine in
this paper, although only in a special case.
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The general strategy we suggest to adopt in order to address this question
is to investigate whether some kind of time asymmetry is already present
at the level of the formalism. A formal investigation of course can yield no
normative conclusion about the interpretation of the quantum probabilities.
However, we take it that it can provide useful guidelines for choosing or
constructing a good interpretation. For instance, one could consider proba-
bilities as used in the description of classical stochastic processes. We claim
(but will not discuss this point here) that in this example there is no for-
mal equivalent of an open future, since a classical stochastic process is just
a probability measure over a space of trajectories, so the formal definition
is completely time-symmetric. Transition probabilities towards the future
can be obtained by conditionalising on the past; equally, transition proba-
bilities towards the past can be obtained by conditionalising on the future.
Individual trajectories may exhibit time asymmetry, and there may be a
quantitative asymmetry between forwards and backwards transition proba-
bilities, but at least as long as the latter are not all 0 or 1, this falls well
short of justifying a notion of fixed past.
In this paper, we shall apply this general strategy in a different context,
namely that of no-collapse approaches to quantum mechanics. For vivid-
ness’s sake, one can imagine that we are discussing an Everett-like interpre-
tation, for instance one in which ‘worlds’ are identified with the ‘histories’ of
the decoherent histories approach (briefly sketched below), and in which the
probabilities emerge from the deterministic Schro¨dinger equation as objec-
tive chances identified through a decision-theoretic analysis (see for instance
Saunders 1993 and Wallace 2005 for these two aspects, respectively). How-
ever, and I wish to emphasise this point from the outset, our analysis will be
carried out purely at the formal level, so that our results may be applied to
the quantum probabilities irrespective of the chosen (no-collapse) approach
or of the attendant interpretation of probability. In particular, I believe
that the analysis below will apply also to pilot-wave theories, such as (de-
terministic) de Broglie-Bohm theory, where probabilities emerge in a way
roughly analogous to that in classical statistical mechanics (see e.g. Du¨rr,
Goldstein and Zangh`ı 1992), or such as (stochastic) beable theories, where
the notion of probability is presupposed and its interpretation, presumably,
is open (Bell 1984).
The way we shall proceed is as follows. Probabilities enter quantum mechan-
ics at the level of the (real or apparent) collapse of the quantum state, the
description given by the Schro¨dinger evolution being entirely deterministic.
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Time asymmetry also enters quantum mechanics at the level of collapse,
the Schro¨dinger equation being time-symmetric in a well-defined sense. The
quantum probabilities thus appear to be very good candidates for probabili-
ties that are intrinsically time-directed. We shall sketch the relevant aspects
of these questions in section 2.
Then we shall focus on no-collapse approaches to quantum mechanics. In or-
der to keep the discussion general, and not get tied up with questions of inter-
pretation, we shall discuss probabilities and their putative time-directedness
within the framework provided by decoherence, specifically by the formal-
ism of decoherent histories. I have suggested elsewhere (Bacciagaluppi 2003)
that the phenomenon of decoherence is the crucial ingredient that allows all
major no-collapse interpretations to recover the appearance of collapse. The
argument below does not depend on this, although of course its range of ap-
plication does: the argument will apply precisely to those approaches to
quantum mechanics (and their associated notion of probability) that make
such use of decoherence. The idea of decoherence is often linked to the pic-
ture of a branching structure for the universal wave function, which in turn
(at least from an Everettian perspective) is close to the intuition of ‘open
future’, but our discussion has no need to link the histories formalism and its
probabilities to either Everett interpretations or any other interpretations
of quantum mechanics.
The notion of decoherence will be briefly sketched in section 3, together
with the specific formalism of decoherent histories. Our use of decoherent
histories does not carry any particular interpretational commitments, de-
spite the amount of controversy that has surrounded this notion. We have
chosen this formalism simply because it provides a very convenient and ex-
plicit way of discussing probabilities in the framework of decoherence. In
particular, decoherent histories allow us to embed collapse-style probabili-
ties, with their time-asymmetric aspects, within the no-collapse framework
of the Schro¨dinger equation.
In section 4, we shall criticise a common misconception regarding the ar-
row of time in the decoherent histories formalism. Instead of introduc-
ing a two-vector formalism, as is common in the literature, we shall retain
the usual one-vector formalism of the Schro¨dinger equation and introduce
separate ‘forwards’ and ‘backwards’ decoherence conditions. Our proposal
was sketched already in Bacciagaluppi (2002) (which focuses on the related
‘branching space-time’ structure of the wave function and uses it to discuss
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the concept of locality in many-worlds interpretations).
We shall use our conclusions to discuss the status of probabilities in no-
collapse quantum mechanics. This will take up our final section 5. On the
basis of our discussion of forwards and backwards decoherence from sec-
tion 4, we shall suggest that an interpretation of the no-collapse quantum
probabilities should allow for time directedness to be a merely contingent
feature of the probabilities. On the other hand, we shall argue that deco-
herence can only be observed as decoherence and never as recoherence from
the perspective of an internal observer, so that there is scope for time di-
rectedness in the interpretation of probabilities, but in a perspectival sense.
2 Quantum mechanics and time (a)symmetry
2.1 Schro¨dinger equation and arrow of collapse
The general form of the problem of the arrow of time in physics is that the
fundamental equations are assumed to be time-symmetric, but that some
class of phenomena appear to be time-directed (or at least disproportionately
favouring one time direction). An example specific to quantum mechanics
is the tension between the time symmetry of the Schro¨dinger equation and
the time asymmetry of what phenomenologically appears as ‘collapse’.
Time reversal for wave functions is implemented as
ψ(x, t) 7→ ψ∗(x,−t) , (1)
and thus, because H∗ = H, the Schro¨dinger equation
i~
∂
∂t
ψ(x, t) = Hψ(x, t) (2)
is time-symmetric.
It is quite obvious that (2) allows for solutions that are not individually
time-symmetric, and thus allows for time-asymmetric behaviour. Indeed, a
time-symmetric solution ψ(x, t) will be symmetric iff
ψ(x, t) = ψ∗(x,−t) . (3)
This is a non-trivial condition, equivalent to having
ψ(x, 0) = ψ∗(x, 0) (4)
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for some time t = 0.
However, the problem of the ‘arrow of collapse’ is that some phenomena,
specifically in situations of measurement, appear not to be described at all
by the Schro¨dinger equation, but by the so-called collapse or projection
postulate, which in the simplest case states the following. At measurement
times, a state |ψ〉 appears to be transformed to one of the states Pα|ψ〉 (up to
normalisation), with probability Tr(|ψ〉〈ψ|Pα), where the Pα are the eigen-
projections of the measured observable. Therefore the (apparent) evolution
of a quantum state |ψ(t0)〉 is given alternatively by periods of Schro¨dinger
evolution Uti+1ti and ‘collapses’ Pαi :
|ψ(t0)〉 −→ Utn+1tnPαnUtntn−1 . . . Pα1Ut1t0 |ψ(t0)〉 (5)
(up to normalisation), with overall probability
Tr
(
PαnUtntn−1 . . . Pα1Ut1t0 |ψ(t0)〉〈ψ(t0)|U∗t1t0Pα1 . . . U∗tntn−1Pαn
)
. (6)
If we attempt a time reversal, taking the final state and applying to it the
same procedure in reverse,
|ψ(tn+1)〉 −→ U∗t1t0Pα1U∗t2t1 . . . PαnU∗tn+1tn |ψ(tn+1)〉 (7)
(again up to normalisation), we see that in general this state is different
from |ψ(t0)〉 (nor is the sequence of intermediate states reversed). The cor-
responding probability,
Tr
(
Pα1U
∗
t2t1
. . . PαnU
∗
tn+1tn
|ψ(tn+1)〉〈ψ(tn+1)|Utn+1tnPαn . . . Ut2t1Pα1
)
, (8)
in general is also different from (6).
As a simple example take a spin-1/2 particle in an arbitrary initial state
|ψ(t0)〉 = α|+x〉+ β|−x〉, and let it be subject to a measurement of spin in
x-direction at time t1, and to a measurement of spin in z-direction at time
t2, with no further evolution afterwards.
The sequence of states from t0 to t3 is then for instance given (up to nor-
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malisation) by:
(α|+x〉+ β|−x〉)⊗ |M10 〉 ⊗ |M20 〉
Ut1t0−−−→ α|+x〉 ⊗ |M1+〉 ⊗ |M20 〉+ β|−x〉 ⊗ |M1−〉 ⊗ |M20 〉
Px+−−→ α|+x〉 ⊗ |M1+〉 ⊗ |M20 〉
Ut2t1−−−→ α√
2
|+z〉 ⊗ |M1+〉 ⊗ |M2+〉+
α√
2
|−z〉 ⊗ |M1+〉 ⊗ |M2−〉
P z+−−→ α√
2
|+z〉 ⊗ |M1+〉 ⊗ |M2+〉
Ut3t2−−−→ α√
2
|+z〉 ⊗ |M1+〉 ⊗ |M2+〉 ,
(9)
and the corresponding probability for the event ‘spin-x up, followed by spin-
z up’ is |α|
2
2
.
The reverse procedure, however, yields the following (always up to normal-
isation):
|+z〉 ⊗ |M1+〉 ⊗ |M2+〉
U∗
t3t2−−−→ |+z〉 ⊗ |M1+〉 ⊗ |M2+〉
P z∗+ =P
z
+−−−−−→ |+z〉 ⊗ |M1+〉 ⊗ |M2+〉
U∗
t2t1−−−→ |+z〉 ⊗ |M1+〉 ⊗ |M20 〉
Px∗+ =P
x
+−−−−−→ 1√
2
|+x〉 ⊗ |M1+〉 ⊗ |M20 〉
U∗
t1t0−−−→ 1√
2
|+x〉 ⊗ |M1+〉 ⊗ |M20 〉 ,
(10)
with a probability for ‘spin-z up, preceded by spin-x up’ of 1
2
.
Therefore, the apparent time evolution of the state, i.e. the evolution in-
cluding collapse, is clearly not time-symmetric, as opposed to that given by
the Schro¨dinger evolution.
2.2 Time symmetry in collapse approaches and no-collapse
approaches to quantum mechanics
The main alternative in the foundational approaches to quantum mechanics
is the alternative between collapse approaches, which take (5), or rather,
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some more precise variant thereof, as fundamental, and no-collapse ap-
proaches, which take the Schro¨dinger equation as fundamental, and attempt
to explain (5) as some effective description.
If one wishes to adopt the first alternative and at the same time uphold time
symmetry at the level of the fundamental equations, then one is committed
to a symmetrisation of the collapse postulate. To this end, one can use
the well-known symmetrisation of the probability formula (6) introduced by
Aharonov, Bergmann and Lebowitz (1964), where instead of the probability
formula (6) one uses the so-called ABL formula:
Tr
(
|ψ(tn+1)〉〈ψ(tn+1)|Utn+1tnPαnUtntn−1 . . . Pα1Ut1t0
|ψ(t0)〉〈ψ(t0)|U∗t1t0Pα1 . . . U∗tntn−1PαnU∗tn+1tn
)
∑
α1,...,αn
Tr
(
|ψ(tn+1)〉〈ψ(tn+1)|Utn+1tnPαnUtntn−1 . . . Pα1Ut1t0
|ψ(t0)〉〈ψ(t0)|U∗t1t0Pα1 . . . U∗tntn−1PαnU∗tn+1tn
)
. (11)
Note that if one takes as |ψ(tn+1)〉 one of the possible ‘collapsed’ states
after a sequence of measurements, this formula can be understood simply
as describing post-selection in an ensemble of systems. This use of the
formula is compatible with any approach to quantum mechanics, even with
a no-collapse Everett approach (as in Vaidman’s work, see e.g. Vaidman
2007), or indeed with the usual time-asymmetric, forward-in-time collapse
postulate.
On the other hand, one can use this formula to define an explicitly time-
symmetric collapse approach, by taking |ψ(t0)〉 and 〈ψ(tn+1)| to be inde-
pendent of each other. These two quantum states can both be understood
as evolving according to the unitary evolution interrupted by occasional col-
lapses, one towards the future and one towards the past. At each instant
there are therefore two quantum states, and both contribute, via (11), to
the probability for the collapses that punctuate their evolutions. A two-
vector formalism based on the ABL formula (11) with arbitary |ψ(t0)〉 and
〈ψ(tn+1)| has been explicitly proposed by Aharonov and Vaidman (2002).
A symmetrised collapse is presumably the natural picture behind this for-
malism.
In this paper we focus on the second alternative. In a no-collapse approach
to the arrow of collapse, one will take the time-symmetric Schro¨dinger equa-
tion, as described above, to be the fundamental equation of the theory, and
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seek to explain time asymmetry purely as a feature of effective collapse.
The appearance of collapse will be explained differently in the different ap-
proaches (by adding Bohm corpuscles for instance, or by interpreting the
quantum state as describing many worlds or minds), and the topic of this
paper are those no-collapse approaches that see the appearance of collapse
as somehow related to loss of interference as described by the theory of
decoherence. We thus turn to a brief description of the latter.
3 Decoherence and decoherent histories
Loosely speaking, decoherence is the suppression of interference between
components of the state of a system (or of some degrees of freedom of a
system) through suitable interaction with the environment (or with some
other degrees of freedom of the system). A paradigm example is a two-slit
experiment with sufficiently strong light shining on the electron between
the slits and the screen: if photons are scattered off the electrons (thus,
in a sense, detecting the passage of the electrons through either slit), the
interference pattern at the screen is suppressed. If this is the case, we can
also talk about which ‘trajectory’ an individual electron has followed and
we can consistently assign probabilities to alternative trajectories, so that
probabilities for detection at the screen can be calculated by summing over
intermediate events. None of this strictly formal talk of probabilities of
course implies that the electron has actually gone through one or other of
the slits (or, when decoherence is applied to measurement situations, that
the measurement yields a definite result).
The decoherent histories formalism (Griffiths 1984, Omne`s 1988, Gell-Mann
and Hartle 1990), provides an abstract approach to decoherence by indeed
defining it in terms of when we can obtain consistent formal expressions
for the probabilities of alternative histories, defined in turn as time-ordered
sequences of projection operators (usually Heisenberg-picture operators),
strictly within the formal apparatus of no-collapse quantum mechanics.
While the various attempts at basing interpretations of quantum mechanics
around this formalism are the subject of controversy (see Dowker and Kent
1996), we take it that the formalism of decoherent histories can be used un-
controversially as an abstract description of certain features of decoherence.
These features include the possibility of defining over time the identity of
components of the state and of formally defining collapse-type probabilities.
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This is the aspect that is of particular interest here.
The formalism can be described in a nutshell as follows. Take orthogonal
families of projections with
∑
α1
Pα1(t) = 1, . . . ,
∑
αn
Pαn(t) = 1 (12)
(in Heisenberg picture). Choose times t1, . . . , tn and define histories as time-
ordered sequences of projections
Pα1(t1), . . . , Pαn(tn) (13)
at the given times, choosing one projection from each family, respectively.
The histories are then said to form an alternative and exhaustive set.
Given a state ρ, we wish to define probabilities for the resulting set (including
further coarse-grainings of the histories). The usual probability formula
based on the collapse postulate would yield
Tr
(
Pαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)ρPα1(t1) . . . Pαn(tn)
)
(14)
as ‘candidate probabilities’, but in general if one coarse-grains further, in the
sense of summing over intermediate events, one does not obtain probabilities
of the same form (14). This is because in general there are non-zero inter-
ference terms between different histories. Now, the consistency or (weak)
decoherence condition is precisely that interference terms should vanish for
any pair of distinct histories:
ReTr
(
Pαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)ρPα′1(t1) . . . Pα′n(tn)
)
= 0 (15)
for {αi} 6= {α′i} (we gloss over differences in the definitions adopted by
various authors). In this case (14) defines probabilities for all histories of the
set (including coarse-grainings) or, equivalently, it defines the distribution
functions for a stochastic process with the histories as trajectories.
Formulas (14) and (15) can easily be translated into the Schro¨dinger picture,
in which they read
Tr
(
PαnUtntn−1 . . . Pα1Ut1t0ρ(t0)U
∗
t1t0
Pα1 . . . U
∗
tntn−1
Pαn
)
, (16)
and
ReTr
(
PαnUtntn−1 . . . Pα1Ut1t0ρ(t0)U
∗
t1t0
Pα′
1
. . . U∗tntn−1Pα′n
)
= 0 , (17)
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respectively.
One should also note that a stronger form of the decoherence condition,
namely the vanishing of both the real and imaginary part of the trace ex-
pression in (15), can be used to prove theorems on the existence of (later)
‘permanent records’ of (earlier) events in a history. Indeed, if the state ρ is
a pure state |ψ〉〈ψ| this strong decoherence condition (sometimes also called
‘medium decoherence’) is equivalent, for all n, to the orthogonality of the
vectors
Pαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)|ψ〉 , (18)
and this in turn is equivalent to the existence of a set of orthogonal pro-
jections Rα(tf ) for any tf ≥ tn that extend consistently the given set of
histories and are perfectly correlated with the histories of the original set.
The existence of such ‘generalised’ records (which need not be stored in sep-
arate degrees of freedom, such as an environment or measuring apparatus)
is thus equivalent in the case of pure states to strong decoherence (Gell-
Mann and Hartle 1990). Similar results involving imperfectly correlated
records can be derived in the case of mixed states (Halliwell 1999). The
notion of permanent records is rather close to the notion of a ‘fixed past’,
but the weak decoherence condition will mostly suffice for our purpose of
discussing whether probabilities in decoherent histories have some genuine
time-directed aspect.
4 Time (a)symmetry and decoherent histories
4.1 Standard analysis
The time asymmetry of the probabilities defined via decoherence consists in
the fact that if we exchange the time ordering of the histories and insert into
(15), the resulting histories generally fail to decohere, so one cannot take
the corresponding expression,
Tr
(
Pα1(t1) . . . Pαn(tn)ρPαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)
)
, (19)
to define distribution functions. As we shall see below (see (36) and (37)),
the candidate probabilities (19) are also generally different from those de-
fined by (14).
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This means that if one wishes to make retrodictions rather than predictions,
i.e. if one is currently at time tn+1 and wishes to calculate the probabilities
for the given histories, then one should stick to formula (14), and not use
(19). In Schro¨dinger picture, this means calculating back the state at t0 and
using the predictive formula for that time. Indeed, unlike the case of (14),
where in the Schro¨dinger picture the state enters the probability formula as
an ‘initial’ state (16), in the case of (19) the state enters as a ‘final’ state,
Tr
(
Pα1U
∗
t2t1
. . . PαnU
∗
tn+1tn
ρ(tn+1)Utn+1tnPαn . . . Ut2t1Pα1
)
. (20)
Phenomenologically the quantum state collapses, and if we wish to make
retrodictions, we do not use the uncollapsed state at time tn+1 but the
collapsed one (and we often post-select, i.e. conditionalise on Pαn).
Such time asymmetry in the probabilities is what we actually observe and
aim to describe, but in the standard literature on decoherent histories (e.g.
Gell-Mann and Hartle 1994, Kiefer 1996, Hartle 1998) one objects to the
fact that the asymmetry appears to be inherent in the form of (15), i.e.
decoherent histories simply appear to incorporate the asymmetry of the
collapse postulate into the fundamental concepts of the approach. We shall
now see how this problem is usually approached, then develop our own
alternative approach.
What is generally done is to modify the decoherence condition in order to
obtain a time-neutral criterion. The new condition is that
ReTr
(
ρfPαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)ρiPα′1(t1) . . . Pα′n(tn)
)
= 0 (21)
for {αi} 6= {α′i}, i.e. that a new functional should vanish for any two different
histories. (A condition of this form, and not one of the form (15), is actually
the one used by Griffiths 1984, who mentions its explicit time symmetry.)
Note that in this formula there appear two quantum states ρi and ρf , one in
‘initial’ position and one in ‘final’ position. Correspondingly, the probability
for a history from a set that is decoherent according to the new definition,
should be proportional to
Tr
(
ρfPαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)ρiPα1(t1) . . . Pαn(tn)
)
. (22)
The normalisation factor can be shown to be equal to Tr(ρfρi) (that is,
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provided this is non-zero). Indeed, one has
Tr
(
ρfPαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)ρiPα1(t1) . . . Pαn(tn)
)
=ReTr
(
ρfPαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)ρiPα1(t1) . . . Pαn(tn)
)
=ReTr
(
ρfPαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)ρi(
∑
α′
1
Pα′
1
(t1)) . . . (
∑
α′
n
Pα′n(tn))
)
,
(23)
because of (21), so that
∑
α1,...,αn
Tr
(
ρfPαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)ρiPα1(t1) . . . Pαn(tn)
)
=ReTr
(
ρf (
∑
αn
Pαn(tn)) . . . (
∑
α1
Pα1(t1))ρi
)
=ReTr(ρfρi) ,
(24)
and Tr(ρfρi) is real.
By the cyclicity of the trace, it is manifest that (21) and the resulting prob-
abilities are indeed time-symmetric, e.g.
Tr
(
ρfPαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)ρiPα1(t1) . . . Pαn(tn)
)
Tr(ρfρi)
=
Tr
(
ρiPα1(t1) . . . Pαn(tn)ρfPαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)
)
Tr(ρiρf )
. (25)
Thus, according to the standard line, it is necessary to introduce the pair
of states ρi and ρf in order to make decoherence not intrinsically time-
directed. The observed time-asymmetric phenomena are to be explained
accordingly in terms of a contingent asymmetry between the ‘initial’ and
‘final’ boundary conditions, with ρi a certain kind of pure state and ρf close
to the identity operator. The problem is thus reduced to a form familiar
from other branches of physics, namely one tries to reduce time-directed
phenomena to the existence of special boundary conditions (which may or
may not be in need of further explanation, according to one’s take on the
problem).
Formula (25) is obviously reminiscent of the ABL formula (11) of standard
quantum mechanics (with the simplified normalisation factor deriving from
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the decoherence condition (21)), and appears to have been inspired by it.
Since the decoherent histories formalism is generally considered a no-collapse
formalism, the two states ρi and ρf (when translated into Schro¨dinger pic-
ture) are presumably a pair of non-collapsing wave functions of the universe
that take the place of the single wave function of the other no-collapse ap-
proaches.
While this proposal appears to solve the problem of the time-asymmetry of
the decoherence condition, it should not go unquestioned.
In the first place, it is a major modification of quantum mechanics that at
present is not required by empirical considerations (the condition ρf ≈ 1
means that the probabilities are indistinguishable in practice from the ‘time-
directed’ ones). True, there may be reasons for adopting such a modifica-
tion of standard quantum mechanics. For instance, Gell-Mann and Hartle
(1994) use their two-state formulation in order to study the possibility of
‘time-symmetric cosmologies’ (we shall return to this point in section 4.4).
Further, Hartle (1998) suggests that the formula may be useful for encoding
some violations of unitarity, or that it may become necessary if empirical
data start violating the usual quantum mechanical probability formula (i.e.
if ρf is not close to the identity). If, however, one’s primary concern is with
the time asymmetry of the decoherence condition, one should ask oneself
whether such a radical solution is necessary.
Indeed, this proposal seems to throw out the baby with the bath water, in
the following sense. In the context of the arrow of time, the motivation
for adopting a no-collapse approach is the hope that, by insisting on the
time-symmetric Schro¨dinger equation as fundamental, one might be able
to explain the phenomenological time-asymmetry of collapse as an effective
description. By requiring two states, however, one renounces this strategy
without even putting up a fight. This is strange, because the interest of the
decoherent histories approach (from the point of view of the arrow of time)
would seem to be precisely that the time-asymmetric probabilities (6) appear
in the formalism without invoking the time-asymmetric evolution (5) of the
state. Indeed, we can consider the evolution of the state as given always
by the Schro¨dinger equation, with the probability formula (16) encoding
how the state at different times gives the probabilities for suitable histories
defined by the corresponding Schro¨dinger projections at the given times.
Intuitively, one would thus hope that this formalism describes the emergence
of time-directed probabilities at the level of histories from the fundamental
13
time-symmetric level of the Schro¨dinger equation.
4.2 New proposal
We now claim against standard wisdom that it is not necessary to go to a
more general theory and introduce two quantum states ρi and ρf in order
to restore the time symmetry of the decoherent histories framework. We
shall argue that the usual theory is already symmetric enough and that any
phenomenological asymmetry can be encoded in a single state ρ.
The apparent difficulty with this is that while it seems that, by adopting the
decoherent histories formalism, we have embedded the asymmetric collapse
probabilities (to be suitably interpreted) into the no-collapse formalism of
quantum mechanics, as the ‘no-collapse strategy’ set out to do, this has
been achieved by imposing a condition on the histories that is itself time-
asymmetric. So it appears that we may have put in the asymmetry by hand
at the stage of defining our criterion for decoherence, and that the resulting
asymmetry is an artefact of the formalism. Indeed, the decoherence condi-
tion appears to select arbitrarily a direction of time, since the expression for
the interference terms in (15), i.e.
ReTr
(
Pαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)ρPα′1(t1) . . . Pα′n(tn)
)
, (26)
is time-directed: these are the interference terms for the evolution of the
wave function towards the future. The problem can be phrased as the ques-
tion: why not require that the interference terms towards the past, i.e. if we
insert ρ into the formula as a ‘final state’,
ReTr
(
Pα1(t1) . . . Pαn(tn)ρPα′n(tn) . . . Pα′1(t1)
)
, (27)
vanish for different histories? The arbitrariness lies in our requiring one
condition rather than the other.
If this is the problem, however, the most natural move seems to be not to
choose arbitrarily the ‘forwards’ decoherence condition, i.e. (15), but enter-
tain the possibility that (27) might also vanish — a ‘backwards decoherence’
condition,
ReTr
(
Pα1(t1) . . . Pαn(tn)ρPα′n(tn) . . . Pα′1(t1)
)
= 0 (28)
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for any two different histories — either concurrently with forwards decoher-
ence or as an alternative to it. Note that the satisfaction of either condition,
given a state ρ and a set of histories is an objective feature of the given state
and set of histories. And either condition allows us to define probabilities
for sets of histories.
If only one condition is satisfied, either forwards decoherence (15) or back-
wards decoherence (28), the choice is substantial, but it is not arbitrary:
again, it is the state and the set of histories themselves that select one di-
rection of time over another. (Note also that the terminology of ‘forwards’
and ‘backwards’ decoherence is purely conventional, and that the two terms
could be interchanged.)
Before seeing a concrete example, note that in the case in which both de-
coherence conditions are satisfied, one can now show that the probabilities
(14) and (19), defined by the two conditions, coincide. Indeed, we have
Tr
(
Pαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)ρPα1(t1) . . . Pαn(tn)
)
=
ReTr
(
Pαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)ρ
)
, (29)
since the left-hand side is equal to its real part and since
ReTr
(
Pαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)ρPα1(t1) . . . Pαn(tn)
)
=
ReTr
(
Pαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)ρ(
∑
α′
1
Pα′
1
(t1)) . . . (
∑
α′n
Pα′
n
(tn))
)
, (30)
by the (forwards) decoherence condition. Similarly with the time order of
projections reversed:
Tr
(
Pα1(t1) . . . Pαn(tn)ρPαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)
)
=
ReTr
(
ρPαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)
)
. (31)
But the two right-hand sides of (29) and (31) are equal by the cyclicity of
the trace. Therefore, the two probabilities coincide:
Tr
(
Pαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)ρPα1(t1) . . . Pαn(tn)
)
=
Tr
(
Pα1(t1) . . . Pαn(tn)ρPαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)
)
. (32)
15
Now, as an example, let us take again the spin-1/2 particle of section 2.1.
The particle has the initial state |ψ(t0)〉 = α|+x〉 + β|−x〉 and is subjected
consecutively to a spin-x measurement at t1 and a spin-z measurement at
t2. The final state of the particle and the two apparatuses at some later
time t3 is
|ψ(t3)〉 = α√
2
|+z〉 ⊗ |M1+〉 ⊗ |M2+〉+
α√
2
|−z〉 ⊗ |M1+〉 ⊗ |M2−〉+
β√
2
|+z〉 ⊗ |M1−〉 ⊗ |M2+〉+
β√
2
|−z〉 ⊗ |M1−〉 ⊗ |M2−〉 . (33)
Since the four components of the final state are orthogonal, by virtue of the
measurement records, the histories formed by the projections P x±(t1), P z±(t2),
or, more precisely, by the projections
P x±(t1)⊗ 1⊗ 1, P z±(t2)⊗ 1⊗ 1 , (34)
form a (forwards) decoherent set. One expects this set of histories to fail
to decohere backwards, because the initial state lacks records of the later
measurements. To show this, given the definition of (32) above, we only
need to check that the forwards and backwards candidate probabilities (14)
and (19) are different. And, indeed, this is generally the case. The relevant
probabilities can be calculated from the reduced states of the particle, that
is (in Schro¨dinger picture)
|ψ(t0)〉 = α|+x〉+ β|−x〉 ,
ρ(t3) =
|α|2 + |β|2
2
|+z〉〈+z|+ |α|
2 + |β|2
2
|−z〉〈−z| = 1
2
1 .
(35)
The forwards probabilities (14) are therefore given by
p(P x+(t1), P
z±(t2)) = |〈ψ(t0)|+x〉|2 |〈+x|±z〉|2 =
|α|2
2
,
p(P x−(t1), P z±(t2)) = |〈ψ(t0)|−x〉|2| 〈−x|±z〉|2 =
|β|2
2
,
(36)
while the backwards probabilities are given by
p(P z±(t2), P
x
±(t1)) = Tr
(1
2
1|±z〉〈±z|
)
|〈±z|±x〉|2 = 1
4
. (37)
Thus, unless |α|2 = |β|2 = 1
2
, the forwards and backwards probabilities do
not coincide, and therefore the histories fail to decohere backwards in time.
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If the final state had the form |ψ(t3)〉 = α|+x〉+β|−x〉, the reverse would be
true, and for |α|2 6= |β|2 the same set of histories would decohere backwards
but not forwards in time. In either case, satisfaction of only one of the
decoherence conditions gives rise to probabilities that are time-asymmetric
both in their formal expression and in their actual values.
Clearly, to explain this ‘arrow of decoherence’ in general, one should analyse
the (symmetric) role played by the dynamics (what kind of Hamiltonians are
necessary in order to obtain decoherence?) and the (symmetry-breaking)
role played by special, presumably (as here) ‘low-entanglement’ initial or
final conditions (note that initial and final quantum states cannot be speci-
fied independently since unitary evolution is assumed throughout). Further
questions are whether and how these conditions relate to the existence of
observers and agents like us. But the discussion in this paper is limited
to the formal aspects of the time symmetry and asymmetry of probabili-
ties. Insofar as the standard proposal in the decoherent histories literature
(which we have reviewed in the previous subsection) allows one to reduce
the time asymmetry of decoherence to a more familiar one of explaining
special initial or final conditions, so does the present suggestion: depend-
ing on an appropriate initial or final condition (corresponding to a single
Heisenberg-picture ρ), there are certain processes, namely the suppression
of interference terms between certain histories, that typically occur in one
direction of time (15) or the opposite one (28), although the fundamental
equation allows for both types of solutions. Unlike the standard approach,
our suggestion applies to the framework of the usual Schro¨dinger equation,
thus along the established lines of the no-collapse approach to the arrow of
collapse in quantum mechanics (cf. section 2.2).
4.3 Time-symmetric case
We shall now have a brief look at the symmetrical situation in which both
the forwards and the backwards decoherence condition are satisfied. In
this case, the arbitrariness of choosing one condition over another does not
matter.
We shall show in particular: (i) that the time-symmetric case is non-trivial,
in the sense that probabilities for histories that decohere in both directions
of time need not be all 0 or 1 (even in the case of a pure quantum state),
and (ii) that satisfaction of both forwards and backwards decoherence is
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not equivalent to the special case of the standard time-neutral decoherence
condition (21) with ρi = ρf = ρ, i.e. it is not equivalent to
ReTr
(
ρPαn(tn) . . . Pα1(t1)ρPα′1(t1) . . . Pα′n(tn)
)
= 0 (38)
(for different histories). In this connection, it should be noted that Gell-
Mann and Hartle (1994) show (38) to be an overly restrictive condition, as
well as showing that the assumption that both ρi and ρf are pure is also
very restrictive.
To show both the above claims, take the special case of (38) with ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|
pure. In this case, the corresponding probabilities (25) reduce to
Tr
(
|ψ〉〈ψ|Pαn (tn) . . . Pα1(t1)|ψ〉〈ψ|Pα1 (t1) . . . Pαn(tn)
)
=
|〈ψ|Pαn (tn) . . . Pα1(t1)|ψ〉|2 . (39)
By the same argument used to derive (23) or (30), we see that the same
probabilities are also equal to
Tr
(
|ψ〉〈ψ|Pαn (tn) . . . Pα1(t1)|ψ〉〈ψ|Pα1 (t1) . . . Pαn(tn)
)
=Tr
(
|ψ〉〈ψ|Pαn (tn) . . . Pα1(t1)|ψ〉〈ψ|
)
=〈ψ|Pαn (tn) . . . Pα1(t1)|ψ〉 .
(40)
But then, all probabilities are 0 or 1.
In this case, since the Utn+1tnPαnUtntn−1 . . . Pα1Ut1t0 |ψ(t0)〉 are orthogonal
components of |ψ(t0)〉 (in Schro¨dinger picture), each of the former must
be the zero vector in order to be orthogonal to the latter. It follows that
the forwards and backwards decoherence conditions are trivially satisfied.
Instead, we shall now show that the forwards and backwards decoherence
conditions can be satisfied for a pure state also when the probabilities are
not all 0 or 1.
Take again the special case above of the spin-1/2 particle. In this case, the
additional assumption of backwards decoherence not only implies (32), but
is also implied by the equality of the (candidate) probabilities (14) and (19).
Indeed, assume that
Tr
(
P z+(t2)P
x
±(t1)|ψ〉〈ψ|P x±(t1)P z+(t2)
)
=
Tr
(
P x±(t1)P
z
+(t2)|ψ〉〈ψ|P z+(t2)P x±(t1)
)
(41)
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(in Heisenberg picture). Then, since (again due to forwards decoherence)
the first line is equal to
Tr
(
P z+(t2)P
x
±(t1)|ψ〉〈ψ|
)
= Tr
(
(P z+(t2) + P
z
−(t2))|ψ〉〈ψ|P z+(t2)P x±(t1)
)
,
(42)
equation (41) reduces to
Tr
(
(P z+(t2) + P
z
−(t2))|ψ〉〈ψ|P z+(t2)P x±(t1)
)
=
Tr
(
P z+(t2)|ψ〉〈ψ|P z+(t2)P x±(t1)
)
. (43)
Therefore
Tr
(
P x±(t1)P
z
−(t2)|ψ〉〈ψ|P z+(t2)P x±(t1)
)
= 0 (44)
and a fortiori
ReTr
(
P x±(t1)P
z
−(t2)|ψ〉〈ψ|P z+(t2)P x±(t1)
)
= 0 , (45)
which is backwards decoherence.
Since in the case |α|2 = |β|2 = 1
2
the probabilities (36) and (37) coincide,
we have an example in which both forwards and backwards decoherence are
satisfied for a pure state, showing both that probabilities can be non-trivial
and that (38) is not equivalent to the conjunction of forwards and backwards
decoherence.
Note that the example just cited hardly qualifies as a physically inter-
esting example of satisfaction of both conditions. Indeed, while forwards
(strong) decoherence in the example is connected to the existence of mea-
surement records, backwards (strong) decoherence in the example appears
to be an accident, and the corresponding records are indeed merely ‘gener-
alised’ records. (Note also that whether this qualifies as a case of intuitive
‘branching’ of the wave function in both directions of time may be open to
doubt.)
4.4 Time-symmetric cosmologies
To conclude this section, we wish to note that our time-symmetric case (sat-
isfaction of both forwards and backwards decoherence) is also in general not
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equivalent to what Gell-Mann and Hartle (1994) take as the defining charac-
teristic of a ‘time-symmetric cosmology’, namely decoherence and equality
of probabilities for both a set of histories
Pα1(t1), . . . , Pαn(tn) (46)
and the time-reversed set of histories
Pαn(−tn), . . . , Pα1(−t1) (47)
(more precisely, Gell-Mann and Hartle consider CPT-reversed sets of histo-
ries).
Taking our case of a single ρ (or ρi = ρ and ρf = 1 in Gell-Mann and Hartle’s
formulas), we have however that if ρ is time-symmetric, then (quite trivially)
forwards decoherence of the time-reversed set of histories (47), is equivalent
to backwards decoherence of the original set (46). From our discussion
in section 4.2 it then also follows that the probabilities for (46) and (47)
coincide, i.e. time symmetry of ρ and our two decoherence conditions imply
a time-symmetric cosmology in Gell-Mann and Hartle’s sense.
More generally, Page (1993) has shown that if ρi and ρf in Gell-Mann and
Hartle’s formulas are separately time-symmetric and commute, then deco-
herence of both (46) and (47) in the sense of (21) implies that their prob-
abilities coincide and thus that one has a time-symmetric cosmology. The
proof is quite similar to our proof of (32), and in fact if ρi and ρf are time-
symmetric, then the ‘time-neutral’ decoherence functional applied to (47),
ReTr
(
ρiPαn(−tn) . . . Pα1(−t1)ρfPα′1(−t1) . . . Pα′n(−tn)
)
, (48)
is equal to
ReTr
(
ρiPα′
n
(tn) . . . Pα′
1
(t1)ρfPα1(t1) . . . Pαn(tn)
)
, (49)
which is so to speak a two-state version of the backwards decoherence func-
tional applied to the original histories.
Page (1993) stresses that time-symmetric cosmologies in the sense of Gell-
Mann and Hartle can thus be obtained even without requiring a sufficient
condition mentioned by these authors, namely that ρi and ρf be the time
reversals of each other (which given the rest of their discussion would most
likely rule out pure states, such as in a no-boundary cosmology). In partic-
ular one can obtain time-symmetric cosmologies even if one takes ρf = 1.
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We should like to add that, therefore, the wish to consider time-symmetric
cosmologies does also not provide a reason for introducing Gell-Mann and
Hartle’s two-state condition (21).
Note finally that any example of a time-symmetric cosmology in the sense of
Page with ρi pure and time-symmetric and ρf the identity will automatically
provide an example of our time-symmetric case of a set of histories satisfying
both forwards and backwards decoherence.
5 Discussion of probabilities
We now return to our original question of assessing the possibly time-
directed metaphysical status of quantum probabilities in the context of
(decoherence-based) no-collapse approaches to quantum mechanics.
So far we have conducted a formal discussion of the time symmetry or
asymmetry of these probabilities in terms of forwards and backwards de-
coherence. We have argued in section 4 that the framework of decoher-
ent histories, which we use here to describe no-collapse approaches, pro-
vides a way of embedding the quantum probabilities within the usual time-
symmetric description given by the Schro¨dinger equation, in a way that does
not beg the question of time directedness. Probabilities emerge from the
Schro¨dinger equation at the level of histories, contingently on the satisfac-
tion of some decoherence condition. Sometimes the emergent probabilities
are time-asymmetric, in the sense that the corresponding histories satisfy
only one of the two decoherence conditions we have introduced. Sometimes
they are time-symmetric, in the sense that the histories satisfy both deco-
herence conditions, in which case they appear to be no more time-directed
than classical probabilities.
As already mentioned in section 1, while formal considerations cannot en-
force the choice of a particular kind of interpretation, they may very well
provide guidance in the choice of an appropriate interpretation. Our formal
results suggest caution in making sweeping metaphysical statements about
the nature of quantum probabilities, in particular about fixed past and open
future, suggesting instead that any time-directed aspect one may want to
ascribe to specifically quantum probabilities when fleshing out their interpre-
tation (in the context of some no-collapse approach to quantum mechanics,
or if invoking the theorem about records to justify some kind of fixed past)
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should be thought of as merely contingent.
A second type of considerations revolves not around forwards and backwards
decoherence but around decoherence and recoherence, which is the reinter-
ference at later times of components of the quantum state that satisfied the
decoherence condition in the past.
For example, choose t1 < . . . < tn < 0. While a set of histories may satisfy
the forwards decoherence condition,
ReTr
(
PαnUtntn−1 . . . Pα1Ut1t0ρ(t0)U
∗
t1−t0Pα′1 . . . U
∗
tntn−1
Pα′
n
)
= 0 (50)
(for different histories), this does not prevent reinterference from taking place
at times later than tn. Indeed, take the extreme case of a time-symmetric
ρ (in the pure case, this corresponds to (3) or (4)). Then the corresponding
components of the wave function will progressively reinterfere at the times
0 < −tn < . . . < −t1. If a strongly decoherent set of histories recoheres,
then the records at times ti of all previous events will not be permanent,
but will be subject to successive ‘quantum erasure’ between −tn and −t1.
Note that recoherence in the example is equivalent to the backwards deco-
herence of the time-reversed set of histories Pαn(−tn), . . . , Pα1(−t1), which is
different from backwards decoherence of the original set of histories. There-
fore, issues of forwards and backwards decoherence are indeed separate from
issues of decoherence and recoherence.
The possibility of recoherence now raises an important potential objection
to the time-directedness of quantum probabilities. This objection is already
known from classical discussions of the thermodynamic arrow of time: any
apparent emergence of an arrow of time (say through the imposition of
an initial low-entropy boundary condition) can be overturned by behaviour
in the future (e.g. it could be trumped by a final low-entropy boundary
condition). This problem has been discussed in particular by Price (2002),
who refers to it picturesquely as ‘Boltzmann’s time bomb’. Thermodynamic
behaviour could turn into anti-thermodynamic behaviour, for instance in a
perfectly symmetric universe, as in the quantum case of collapse behaviour
turning into ‘anti-collapse’ behaviour in the above example with a time-
symmetric ρ. Therefore the emergence of probabilities, even if asymmetric in
the sense discussed in section 4, is in general a temporally local phenomenon,
again suggesting caution in one’s choice of interpretation.
There is, however, a feature of the quantum probabilities under recoher-
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ence that provides a disanalogy to the classical case. Consider whether
anti-thermodynamic behaviour could be actually witnessed by some ‘ther-
modynamic’ observers (i.e. observers associated with the thermodynamic
arrow of time). This will not be the case in the extreme example of a per-
fectly symmetric universe, since also the operation of their observations and
memories will be reversed (that is, they will be acting as observers of the
thermodynamic behaviour in the opposite time direction). However, one can
imagine that in the presence of sufficiently weak interactions, some thermo-
dynamic observers could directly witness some of the anti-thermodynamic
behaviour.
This now yields a disanalogy between the classical and the quantum case.
In the quantum case, even in the more general situation in which the state ρ
is not time-symmetric, no observer could arguably ever witness decoherence
events followed by recoherence events at some later time, if by observing
an event in a history one means that the observer subsequently possesses
a record of this event. Indeed, as long as records of events persist in the
memory of the observer, the histories comprising the observed events will
decohere, in fact strongly, because of the theorem about records. The as-
sumption of recoherence therefore implies that the observer’s memory of an
event be quantum-erased. If this is the case, however, that observer ar-
guably cannot be said to witness a recoherence event: once the different
components of the quantum state have come together, the observer (if they
survive the process) has no memory of them ever having been distinct, thus
cannot be said to witness an event of distinct components of the quantum
state reinterfering.
While for an external ‘God’s eye’ perspective (such as we arguably have
in spin-echo experiments)decoherence and recoherence are equivalent time-
reversed descriptions of the same phenomenon , there can be no internal
observer who shares the temporal perspective from which this behaviour
could be described as recoherence. From an internal perspective such a
phenomenon could only be described as decoherence. In this specifically
perspectival sense, the arrow of decoherence is immune to special final con-
ditions in its future. This in turn provides scope for an interpretation in
which the quantum probabilities can be thought of as time-directed, not as
a property of the probabilities themselves, but from the perspective of any
observer in the above sense.
The interpretation of quantum probabilities will in general depend on the
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particular approach to quantum mechanics one adopts, in particular, even
restricting oneself to no-collapse approaches, on whether one adopts a (de-
terministic) Bohm approach, a (stochastic) beable approach or an (emer-
gentist) Everett approach. Our analysis above suggests that in all of these
cases, the interpretation of quantum probabilities should take into account
both the dichotomy between forwards and backwards decoherence, suggest-
ing that time directedness should be contingent, and the dichotomy between
decoherence and recoherence, suggesting that time directedness is inappro-
priate from a global perspective, but may be construed as genuine from the
perspective of an internal observer.
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